Showing posts with label Lehman Brothers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Lehman Brothers. Show all posts

Friday, August 13, 2010

Lehman Pointing Fingers at Och-Ziff

Nearly two years after Lehman's failure, despite the piles of evidence pointing to neglect, mismanagement and outright fraud committed by Lehman's leaders, some people still believe that short sellers caused Lehman's downfall. Lawyers for Lehman's estate are furiously subpoenaing Wall Street firms and hedge funds for documents that they think will show that rumor-mongering led to the demise of the storied investment bank. Apparently, Och-Ziff was the only target that objected outright in court to producing the documents. Oh sure, it makes the fund appear guilty, but perhaps it's the $3.3 million cost associated with producing 3.9 million documents that the fund objects to? The lawyers for Lehman's estate claim that Och-Ziff was involved in the spreading of false rumors but provided no additional evidence to support the that claim, other than the fact that Och-Ziff refuses to produce the documents.

According to the WSJ:

Och-Ziff Capital Management LLC "likely disseminated and/or was the recipient" of an inaccurate rumor that Lehman had spun off debt to two Lehman-controlled hedge funds to reduce the investment bank's leverage, according to the filing. Investors were focused on Lehman's debt levels in the months before its failure.

The rumor was one of many "lies" spread by unscrupulous market participants looking to profit from shorting the troubled investment bank's stock, alleged the filing, made on Wednesday by lawyers investigating Wall Street firms on behalf of Lehman's bankruptcy estate.

Ah yes, all those "lies" that everybody was spreading that the investment bank was insolvent and wasn't going to make it and would wind up bankrupt. Those crazy crazy untrue rumors that the investment bank was lying about its leverage ratio, its liquidity, the value of the assets on the balance sheet etc. etc. And now, we must expose those rumor-mongerers in bankruptcy court after said firm has gone bankrupt. How come nobody is subpoenaing all the real lies from all the investment pros that insisted the firm was solvent and cheap at $15 per share?

Tuesday, July 20, 2010

Morgan Stanley, Lehman, and Real Estate Investing

The day before Morgan Stanley is set to report earnings, the WSJ runs a story about the investment bank's attempts to deal with the $46 billion disaster that is MSREF, its commercial property investment funds. MSREF never met a commercial real estate investment it didn't love during the boom and is now stuck with a host of turkeys in every corner of the world. What now? Should it sell the pile of ailing (yet diversified!) real estate investments? After all, both Citi and Bank of America have sold off significant real-estate investment fund businesses in the past month, to Apollo and Blackrock respectively. Also, ING is looking to do the same and MS really does just like to do what everyone else is doing, just later, and less profitably. Should it hold on and hope for the best? After all, the fund still earns management fees even when it does stuff like lose 75% of its investors' money. Maybe leak a story to the press, see if anyone out there has any better ideas?

Here's an idea: Maybe Lehman can buy it? After all, Lehman's bankruptcy has done nothing to slow down the frantic pace of activity at the real estate arm of the now-defunct investment bank. The WSJ reports that Lehman just took over Innkeepers, a REIT that owns more than 70 hotels. Well, this was less of a traditional takeover and more of a "you're wearing it" type of deal, as the hotel operator filed for bankruptcy and Lehman was its largest creditor. Lehman's debt in Innkeepers stems from its participation in the 2007 $1.5 billion buyout performed by none other than Apollo Investment, a subsidiary of the same folks that just bought Citi's real estate portfolio (see above.) Buy low AND high. I think that's called dollar cost averaging.

What should Morgan Stanley do? Tomorrow's earnings announcement will offer some clues as to whether the firm can finally return to its former glory as a premier investment bank, rather than a GS also-ran. If so, maybe MS has a shot at reaping a solid price for its ailing commercial real estate investment funds based on the prestige factor associated with its name. Because it's not going to get top dollar based on the fund's performance.

I'm predicting a lousy quarter for MS. They might even lose money. Why? Because all its competitors have had a lousy quarter and MS does exactly the same thing, except usually worse, even though the market seems to grant them some sort of a premium. How much longer can the premium prevail? Tune in tomorrow.


Tuesday, April 13, 2010

WaMu, Lehman and Fraud

The FT reports that the underwriting at Washington Mutual leading up to its spectacular implosion was "riddled" with fraud, according to a 500 page report being released today. Apparently, fraud rates of 58% and 83% were found in two of Wa Mu's California's offices. Furthermore, nobody at the bank did anything to stop the rampant lying and fraud. The WSJ quotes Stephen Rotella, a former president and COO, at WaMu in a 2007 email that he thought Wa Mu's home-loan division was the worst managed business he'd ever seen in his career, until he saw the company's subprime unit. In any event, former CEO Kerry Killinger, defended his actions, as well as I'm sure the over $100 million he collected in pay during his time at the helm. I mean, it's not easy blowing up the country's largest S&L in five year's time by encouraging employees to commit fraud. It's gotta be worth at least $100 mil.

Meanwhile, in other completely not shocking news for anyone who actually followed what was going on at our nation's banks, the NYT has an article today that discusses Lehman's use of a company that it likely controlled called Hudson Castle, where the investment bank liked to park its risk. If the 2200 page Lehman examiner's report didn't convince you that something was amiss at the investment bank, perhaps this will. Hudson Castle created four separate vehicles, one of which was called Fenway, that issued commercial paper and then used that money to do repos with Lehman. Now read the direct quote from the NYT article: "Lehman itself bought $3 billion of Fenway notes just before its bankruptcy that, in turn, were used to back a loan from Fenway to a Lehman subsidiary." The loan was secured by Lehman's investment in a California property developer, SunCal, which owned a bunch of land. Seriously? Yeah, no fraud going on there.





Friday, March 19, 2010

Merrill Tattled on Lehman

The FT reports that Merrill officials warned the SEC and the Fed in early 2008 that Lehman was "incorrectly calculating a key measure of its financial health" (or, "cooking the books" as you or I might call it.) The former Merrill officials' intentions were far from humanitarian. They alerted regulators because Lehman was touting its reported liquidity position to investors and counterparties as proof that it was sounder than Merrill. Merrill officials probably said to themselves, "Hey wait a minute. I know we're insolvent, but Lehman is DEFINITELY more insolvent than we are. " We're talking about Wall Street guys here. They're so damn competitive.

The Merrill guys didn't believe Lehman's claims. In fact, they thought that Lehman was including regulatory capital in its liquidity calculations. Big no no. So, they picked up the phone and called the SEC and the New York Fed, both of whom did, well, absolutely nothing about it. But we already knew that because we know how this story ended. The SEC declined to comment beyond saying that the folks who fell asleep at the switch at that particular unit are no longer there. The NY Fed claims it was unable to verify that the conversation with Merrill ever took place.

Friday, March 12, 2010

The Lehman Report

The court-appointed examiner's report on Lehman Brothers is available to peruse and it is a doozy. Coming in at over 2,200 pages, the report provides a more detailed look into how and why the investment bank failed spectacularly in September 2008. I say "more detailed" because it was obvious to many, even before the firm collapsed, that the bank was mismarking assets and engaging in accounting fraud. You don't wind up with 10 cents on the dollar as a secured creditor unless the assets were wildly overinflated to begin with. Still, it's always nice to know the details.

Most of the report focuses in on the so-called "Repo 105" transactions. Repos are collateralized loans used to finance a bank's assets and are reported as liabilities on the balance sheet. However, if the repo met conditions of an accounting rule called SFAS 140, it could be counted as a true sale and the assets could be moved off the balance sheet. Lehman used these specific Repo 105 transactions to move assets off of its balance sheet to reduce the leverage ratios it reported to investors. Lehman's auditors, Ernst & Young, even signed off on the transactions, so they had to be kosher, right? According to FT Alphaville, Lehman could not find a US lawyer to sign off on their treatment of these particular repos as a true sale. So what did the enterprising folks at Lehman do? They just went abroad and found some London lawyers to sign off on the transactions. Presto! $50 billion in assets disappeared off of the balance sheet. So while maybe technically not illegal, the transactions were most definitely used in a calculated way to mislead investors about the investment bank's true financial condition.

The folks over at Zerohedge have unearthed more juicy tidbits from the report about the ordinary tri-party repo transactions with JP Morgan that indicate the firm was definitely mismarking assets and that JP Morgan knew about it. According to the excerpts from the report, Lehman was attempting to pledge more and more worthless collateral at par against the loans as the bank's financial condition deteriorated. Apparently, as Lehman neared bankruptcy in September 2008, it had attempted to pledge $3 billion of a security called "Fenway," that was actually asset backed commercial paper credit enhanced by Lehman itself. That's right, backed by the full faith and credit of...Lehman Brothers. JP Morgan said, "Um, no thanks. Maybe some Treasuries would be better? Or perhaps a sack of potatoes?"

Back in August 2008, "JP Morgan had learned that Lehman had pledged self-priced CDOs as collateral over the course of the summer." Lehman "pledged $9.7 billion of collateral, $5.8 billion of which were CDOs priced by Lehman, mostly at face value." Of course they were self-priced. There was no liquid market for CDOs so Lehman had to price them using its own models. Pricing them at par was the really stupid and possibly criminal part. Furthermore, why did JP Morgan just "learn" about this in August? Didn't JP Morgan know what collateral was in the repo since JP was the clearing firm that is supposed to verify and price the collateral in its own repos with customers? Why on earth did JP Morgan ever accept CDOs as collateral in its repos? My how far the standards of the repo market have fallen since back in the day when I was a lowly repo trader. If you didn't have treasuries, agencies, or agency backed MBS, no financing for you!

The report goes on to state that when JP Morgan "discovered" the CDOs and decided it wanted other collateral, Lehman said it had no other collateral to pledge. Ok, so Lehman was clearly insolvent, even during the time that the firm continued to claim that it was swimming in a pool of liquidity and was just a victim of short sellers. Furthermore, JP Morgan KNEW that Lehman was insolvent. Meanwhile, the SEC and the Fed sort of knew about some of this, but probably didn't understand and mostly just had their collective heads stuck up their collective asses.


Wednesday, February 24, 2010

Fallout From Financial Crisis Widespread

This morning's WSJ is a veritable cornucopia of articles detailing the lingering effects of the financial crisis. First, the reader is hit in the face with the headline story "Lending Falls at Epic Pace" and the accompanying graph that depicts, well, lending falling at an epic pace. Aside from the top-tier banks, most of which are making money from trading rather than lending, the rest of the banking industry is suffering, according to the FDIC's quarterly report. Banks registered their biggest full-year decline in total loans outstanding in 67 years. Also, the FDIC's problem bank (those at risk of failing) list grew to 702. Furthermore, more than 5% of all loans were at least three months past due, the highest level recorded in the 26 years the data have been collected.

Moving right along to some dismal local news for those of us in California, there is the story entitled "Lehman's Ghost Haunts California," which tells the sad tale of the aftermath of San Mateo County's failed investment in Lehman Brothers. That $155 million the county punted on Lehman bonds (commercial paper? whatever it was, the risk premium was definitely not justified) is looking pretty foolish now that the public schools are laying off teachers, community colleges are scrapping new facilities and the commuter rail is trimming service.

Speaking of California and really bad investment decisions, you can read all about Calpers latest woes in "Backlash Hits Calpers Property Deals." The story details the controversy surrounding some of Calpers' real estate deals which, in addition to losing buckets of money for California retirees, also had the socially conscious benefit of evicting low income residents from their housing units. Calpers response? "These historical investments were made under previous investment leaders" and outside managers who handle Calpers real-estate investments. Translation? If you're looking for someone to nail to the stake, you might want to go after, um, the other guys who were here. Back in early 2008 when most of Calpers' senior investment managers left for "personal reasons," it turns out those reasons weren't so personal after all. Who could've guessed? Oh yeah, me.

Moving right along, there is the article on yesterday's unexpected plunge in consumer confidence entitled "Jittery Shoppers Dim Stores' Hopes." It turns out that unemployed people don't shop so much. Shocking.

Even Casket Makers are hitting tough times, according to the cleverly titled "Casket Makers Dig In as Sales Take Hit." In addition to discussing how the economic slump is hurting the casket making industry, the article also sports the Pulitzer-worthy opening line of: "As their sales slow, some casket makers worry their business is hitting a dead end."

Looking for some good news amid the gloom? Look no further than "Bon Appetit: Toxic Bonus Yields 72% at Credit Suisse," which tells the tale of the 2000 investment bankers forced to take some of their bonuses in 2009 in the form of toxic assets. The assets have since rallied 72%, although employees can't withdraw from the plan until 2014. According to the story, the bankers groused about the plan when it was first introduced and they are probably still grousing that they only get to collect interest payments until the plan's expiration in four years.

You can read all about Wall Street bonuses rebounding in 2009 in "Wall Street Bonuses Get 17% Bounce." Then again, unless you work on Wall Street, maybe you'd better not.

Wednesday, November 18, 2009

Housing Starts, More on Fannie and Freddie

Housing starts fell 10.6% in October to a seasonally adjusted 529,000 annual rate. Building permits also declined. Those ever-accurate economists were forecasting a 1.7% increase in starts so this number was disappointing to say the least. It seems as if builders are reluctant to break ground on new projects with inventories and vacancies on existing properties sitting at record highs. With both the expiration of the housing tax credits and the end of Fed's aggressive purchases of MBS looming on the horizon, it's not surprising that builders are hesitant. It seems like their time and money is better spent coming up with new programs to lobby the government for, rather than building houses.

Good article in the WSJ about Fannie and Freddie's involvement in the apartment market. If you thought that Fannie and Freddie were just doing their civic duty to prop up the residential mortgage market, you're wrong. The housing behemoths are also huge lenders to multifamily projects. How huge? They did 84% of all multifamily lending in 2008. The 2008 numbers don't scare me quite so much since at least underwriting was tightened up a bit by then and nobody else was lending. What does scare me is the 43% of market share the combined companies had in 2007 and 34% in 2006, back when banks like Lehman brothers were still around doing moronic deals. For example, Fannie and Freddie helped finance the massive and overpriced Archstone Smith apartment LBO by lending $9 billion to the deal. Or my vote for the dumbest real estate transaction of the bubble, Tishman's $5.4 billion purchase of Stuyvesant Town, where Fannie and Freddie purchased $1.5 billion in CMBS from that deal. I'm not sure I understand exactly how financing bloated leveraged buyouts became part of their mission statement, but it was a bubble and fortunately taxpayers are here to clean up the mess. The good news is that Fannie and Freddie's apartment building loans only add up to around $300 billion, which is a mere drop in the bucket compared to the $5 trillion of single-family loans that they back. It always helps to put these things in perspective, doesn't it?

Monday, September 14, 2009

Lehman Brothers Revisited

Markets, regulators, and commentators have had a year to reflect on the repercussions from the failure of Lehman Brothers. Because of the devastation caused by the collapse of the once scrappy and proud investment bank, many have come to the conclusion that it was a big mistake to allow Lehman to go down. The consensus seems to believe that it cost us more to let Lehman fail than it would've to bailout the firm. I completely disagree.

The theory seems to be that Lehman's failure caused a domino affect whereby other liquidity strained institutions also failed because of Lehman. What's become more clear a year later is that some financial firms were insolvent and some only had liquidity problems. While the line between the two became blurred during the heyday of the crisis, the distinction is important. The insolvent firms would've failed regardless of whether Lehman was bailed out. AIG would not have survived. Citi would've gone down. Bank of America, because of its horrible Merrill purchase would've failed as well. The government-assisted sale of Bear Stearns to JP Morgan and the preemptive seizures of Fannie and Freddie, which were all meant to stabilize the market and keep liquidity flowing, did not keep Lehman from failing. The insolvent institutions were doomed; it was only a matter of time. Lehman's failure only sped up the process.

While it is nearly impossible to calculate how much the domino effect of Lehman's failure actually cost the economy, it is indisputable that Lehman's secured creditors received less than 10 cents on the dollar. The firm had an $100 billion hole in its balance sheet, and possibly more. A bailout of Lehman would've only cost our government an additional $100 billion dollars that was simply unrecoverable. So frankly, I'm glad Paulson drew a line in the sand and I wish he'd have kept it there instead of reverting to more bailouts.

The most important thing that happened when Lehman failed was that it reintroduced the idea of risk into investing. Markets from stocks, to emerging markets, to money market funds were slapped across the face with a giant RISK! Credit markets move in cycles and often in the good times, investors forget that they are actually taking risk with their money when they invest and then remember when they lose money in the down cycles. During this last boom, it was as if risk no longer mattered, and investors just made up numbers and plowed headlong into every stupid investment peddled to them. The Fed's decision to take $26 billion in Bear's crappy assets onto its balance sheet and assist the sale to JP Morgan in the early days of the credit crisis introduced the idea that the government would never let a systemically important institution fail. This is precisely why the market ripped for two months following that move. Yippee! The government is going to support every institution that's in trouble, so investing is risk free again. No worries. But as defaults began to rise and losses started piling up, risk reared its ugly head again.

Sadly, the government's intervention through the introduction of a variety of new mechanisms, liquidity injections and direct capital support, has removed the idea of risk taking from investing again. Now everyone is just focused on how much money they can make by taking advantage of the government's largesse. The government has taken away a key function of the market, which is the obligation to make the determination between those institutions that would've survived the crisis and those who should've failed due to too much risk-taking. For example, JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs likely would've survived. They may have been forced to raise very expensive capital from alternative sources, but they probably would've scraped by. By offering government guarantees for their debt and cheap financing for their collateral through the Fed, the government took money from investors and handed it directly to JP and GS. Without these guarantees, we wouldn't be having any discussions about bonuses, because the banks would be hoarding capital to stay alive. While the short-term benefits have been great for the market, the long-term effects are murky, and frankly scare me. If you introduce the idea of risk-free investing for everyone, banks are just going to throw money at stupid investments again expecting a bailout later. Heads I win, tails the taxpayer loses.

The government had six months after Bear caved to come up with a solution for letting financial institutions fail without cratering the market. They failed to do so. It's been a year since Lehman failed and we still don't have a viable plan on the table. This sends a signal to the market that the government is going to support our financial institutions indefinitely. Make no mistake, we will pay for this later.

Thursday, May 14, 2009

Lehman Still Trying to Spin Off Assets

The now-bankrupt investment bank originally pitched the idea of splitting off its real estate assets into a separate company to “extract value” a couple of days before it spiraled out of business. It didn’t go over very well then, maybe it’ll work better this time around. The idea involves spinning off a hodge podge of Miami condos, New York apartment complexes, private equity investments and risky mortgages that internal Lehman calculations have pegged the value at around $45 billion, down about half from its value in September. At non-distressed prices, the assets are valued at around $400 billion, including $300 billion in servicing of assets. The best part is that people inside Lehman have been referring to the unit as Lamco, short for Legacy Asset Management Company. Perhaps they have yet to figure out that the name is only one letter short of the moniker LAMEco?

Apparently executives now running Lamco don’t want to miss out on the big rebound in asset values that is sure to be right around the corner. They wish to legally separate the company from the bankruptcy estate by the beginning of 2010 and then sell shares to the public. After that, they plan to make it all back. Good luck to them. With the way the market has rallied in the past couple of months, I’m sure they’ll find lots of folks who are dying to buy into an IPO of a bunch of highly illiquid assets with questionable ability to generate cash flows.

Sunday, September 14, 2008

Lehman Bankrupt, Bank of America Buying Merrill

Both Barclays and Bank of America opted out of purchasing Lehman.  No surprise.  I wouldn't have bought Lehman without a $60 billion guarantee from the Fed either.  My sources are telling me that a bankruptcy filing by Lehman is imminent.
Meanwhile, Bank of America has moved on to considering a purchase of Merrill Lynch.  Interestingly, a sale of Merrill wasn't even in the cards until this week when it became apparent that investors were losing confidence in any leveraged institution's ability to survive through the credit crunch.  No word on Washington Mutual or AIG's fate.  I guess we'll resolve those issues next weekend.     

Friday, September 12, 2008

Foreclosures, Retail Sales, and Financial Company Deathwatch

US home foreclosures rose again in August.  According to Realty Trac, one in every 416 households received a foreclosure filing in August affecting 303,879 properties nationwide, an increase of 12% from July and 27% from August 2007.  Realty Trac indicated these were the highest numbers they've seen since they started tracking foreclosures.  Nevada was once again ranked as the state with the highest foreclosure rate, followed by California and Arizona.  The rate of increases in default notices moderated in parts of the country due to measures taken by states to give troubled borrowers more time before foreclosure proceedings are initiated.  Whether extra time will actually keep borrowers from ultimately defaulting remains to be seen, but this can be viewed as a small positive in otherwise bleak news.
Meanwhile, retail sales were down .3% with ex-autos down .7%.  Excluding gasoline, however, purchases were unchanged last month.  I think this indicates that consumers are dodging those foreclosure notices from the bank by walking to the mall and shopping all day.  

A few updates on Financial Firms on Life Support in a pleasing bullet point format:

   

Thursday, September 11, 2008

What Price For A Lehman Takeover?

After weeks of speculation surrounding Lehman's fate, a period of time during which analysts were frantically upgrading and downgrading the stock, we are near the final chapter for the storied investment bank.  Despite all of the pundits who continued to insist that Lehman was no Bear Stearns, the final chapter of this story seems suspiciously similar.  Here we are near the end of a week filled with rumors of a liquidity crisis, during which the company posted wrenching losses and apparently drove away any potential investors with unrealistic valuation expectations, and a stock that has fallen off the precipice.  Apparently, Lehman must find a partner in a very short period of time or risk having its credit downgraded which may lead to a real liquidity crisis.  Bank of America is among the potential buyers, according to the Wall Street Journal.  If it is indeed the case that an acquirer can cobble together a bid for an investment bank with over $600 billion in assets, many of them difficult to price, in a 48 hour period, what will it be willing to pay?  It seems incomprehensible that an acquirer would offer to pay anything for Lehman's equity at all.  This is a distressed sale, into a market that is already suffering from significant capital constraints.  As I've stated many times before, very few financial institutions are in a position to digest a firm of Lehman's size.  Clearly, nobody wanted to buy Lehman at full price, so if a sale happens at all, it will be at a discount.  But as with the JP/Bear deal, shareholder approval is required.  If the acquirer offers nothing for the equity, then the shareholders can threaten to vote it down and the market will once again face the prospect of a counterparty's failure.  The Treasury and the Fed are involved in orchestrating this shot-gun marriage as this time the Fed is also a counterparty to Lehman.  Although Lehman has yet to borrow from the discount window, it has more than likely borrowed through the TSLF, and the TAF, the Fed's other loan facilities that it offers to dealers.  These loans are collateralized with assets that are difficult to finance.  If Lehman fails, the Fed is stuck with assets it has to liquidate at uncertain prices.  Rather than face the distasteful prospect of having to testify to congress and explain why the Fed owns even more illiquid mortgage assets, Bernanke and Paulson would much rather stuff someone else with all of Lehman's risk.  Why the market rallied so powerfully into the close remains a mystery to me.  How the now inevitable demise of what used to be the fourth largest US investment bank is rabidly bullish news is really beyond my comprehension.  Post-close financials are sharply lower, particularly Lehman, which is down another 25%.  I suspect the rally won't last.  But, as always, the market is full of surprises.

Wednesday, September 10, 2008

Lehman Posts Loss, Unveils Plan

Lehman posted a preliminary loss of $3.9 billion for the third quarter, much wider than the most pessimistic analyst estimates, and unveiled a restructuring plan in an effort to instill confidence in the wake of yesterday's 45% plunge in the stock.  The meat of the plan is to spin-off its commercial real estate assets to its shareholders and sell a stake in its prized asset-management unit.  The spin-off of the commercial real estate portfolio into a new company called Real Estate Investments Global accomplishes the task of stuffing shareholders with assets that they were hoping the bank would dump, but cushioning the investment bank from further losses in the portfolio.  Note to loyal shareholders: "Thanks! And you're wearing it!"  In the statement Lehman claims that REI Global's "primary focus would be to maximize shareholder returns by selling assets or holding them to maturity."  In my opinion, this is a fancy way to get around the indignity of having to mark these securities to market.  Furthermore, if anyone actually wanted these assets at the valuation that Lehman placed on them, Lehman would've gladly sold them and taken cold hard cash in return.
The investment bank is selling a 55% stake in a subset of its investment management division including asset management, private equity and wealth management.  It is in advanced discussions with a number of potential partners and will announce details of the transaction in "due course."  The asset management sale will be completed in an auction.  Given the recent performance of Lehman's stock price and the absence of alternatives to raise capital for the firm, I would bet that the potential bidders may be shaving a few bucks off of their bids.
In any event, the suspense is over.  Lehman has announced its plans, and investors have reacted with muted interest.  Although the stock has regained what it initially lost in pre-market trading, it is barely up after the precipitous plunge in the shares yesterday.  Continued declines in the stock show a lack of confidence and will be terrible for financials on the heels of yesterday's losses.  Prepare yourselves for yet another bumpy ride.

Tuesday, September 9, 2008

Will Lehman Go To Zero? Today?

Lehman's stock continues its death spiral, down 35% at the moment on little concrete news.  Sure KDB has walked away from the negotiating table, but did people actually believe that this deal was going to happen?  Furthermore, despite all of the rumors bandied about of potential buyers interested in a "hostile takeover," the market is now acting as if KDB was the only viable candidate in the running.  I am inclined to think that something else is behind the stock's free fall.  I am hearing a rumor that the company may pre-announce earnings today and that the news won't be pretty (no surprise to anyone with a pulse.)  I have also heard some speculation that Mr. Paulson's refusal to bailout the preferred investors in Fannie and Freddie was a large hint that the man had reached his limits in terms of offering help to ailing financial institutions.  This is a more plausible explanation for the panic in the stock.  The Fed has given them financing for MBS, the discount window, and term money market funds.  Enough is enough.  If you didn't raise enough capital when you had the chance, don't come crying to the Treasury.  Whatever bargaining chips Mr. Fuld thought he had at the negotiating table grow more threadbare with every downtick in the stock price.  Options volatility and CDS spreads have spiked to crisis levels.  If Mr. Fuld really does have something left up his sleeve, now would be the appropriate time to bust it out.           

Bailouts, CDS Defaults, and DeJa Vu

The historic bailout of Fannie and Freddie by the US Treasury turned out to be only one story in a very interesting and volatile trading day yesterday.  The repercussions of the Treasury's action will be weighed for some time, however, the tightening of mortgage bond spreads seems to be the most positive immediate benefit of the plan.  Spreads on agency MBS came in around 40 basis points, giving the entire banking sector a nice mark-to-market gain.  Interestingly, this was a huge boost to Paulson's equity investment in Fannie and Freddie, as the two firms hold enormous mortgage portfolios.  It appears as if Mr. Paulson learned a thing or two about front-running a trade from his time at Goldman.  The tightening of mortgage spreads, however, did not filter out into the rest of the bond market, indicating that the credit markets are still nervous.
Falling in the category of significant unintended consequences of the bailout was the event of default triggered in the CDS market by the conservatorship.  The ISDA will settle the CDS through cash auctions that will likely take 30 days.  It should prove to be nothing more than a back-office nightmare, unless, of course, somebody finds a huge out-trade.  Apparently the CDS market has grown exponentially, despite the fact that the settlement process is performed through the use of fax machines rather than electronic confirms.  I predict at least a few cases of "No no no!  We definitely sold these.  We were not buyers!  I don't care what your stupid confirm says.  Look it doesn't matter that I can't actually find and produce my confirm, my trader says it was a sell and there is no way I'm going to tell him that I can't find the confirm!"

In bizarre and completely unrelated news, UAL declared bankruptcy in 2002.  Unfortunately, the story was so compelling that it was posted as a new headline yesterday and picked up by Bloomberg.  I suppose it seemed so probable that UAL could file for bankruptcy again, that investors didn't even bother to actually read the story before dumping the stock.  UAL adamantly denied the filing and the error was eventually discovered.  For savvy traders who were paying attention, there was a small window of opportunity to buy UAL at $3 before trading was halted.  
The Lehman saga continues unabated.  Reports this morning about KDB officially ending talks about taking a significant stake in the firm are crushing the stock.  Lehman's options for a private sector rescue continue to narrow, which means its days are numbered.  Something tells me that by the end of the week the enthusiasm surrounding the bailout of Fannie and Freddie will be a distant memory.
  
     

Monday, September 8, 2008

Management Shake-Ups at Lehman and WaMu Can't Change Stinky Investments

If ever there was a time to slip some management changes in below the radar, this weekend was it.  While every investor worth his salt was furiously calculating a new price target on Fannie and Freddie's common and preferred, it was easy to overlook the ousting of a few key executives.  Washington Mutual gave its CEO Kerry Killinger the boot.  According to the Bloomberg report he was ousted "after he failed to halt losses tied to home mortgages."  The newly appointed CEO Alan Fishman, formerly of Meridian Capital, will take a shot next to see if he can halt the losses.  The stock initially ripped on the announcement, before investors realized that a new CEO can't change the fact that the company's balance sheet reeks like a pile of stinking dung.  Speaking of balance sheets that reek, Lehman has shuffled its management yet again.  The company is replacing the current head of fixed income (who spent all of seven months at the post) with two other guys I've never heard of (feel free to click on the link if you actually care about names.)  Dick Fuld remains in charge, and will continue attempting to concoct some sort of spin-off, recap, asset-sale, financing, write-down, half-caff with a twist, but with new yes men by his side.  In my last post about Lehman, I went out on a limb and offered to eat my crox if a deal with KDB actually materialized.  I have yet to put my bib on, so it's looking good for me.  The only good news I can find in the headlines for Lehman and WaMu investors is that Hank Paulson is finished with his Fannie and Freddie plan.  That means he can move on to the next bailout package.  

Wednesday, September 3, 2008

Ospraie Fund Closing and Other Bullish Lehman News

Ospraie Management, a US hedge fund specializing in commodities investments is closing its doors after punting 38.6% of investors' capital year-to-date.  It seems investors want their money back and the fund has opted to suspend redemptions and conduct an orderly liquidation.  How is this hedge fund's performance related to Lehman?  Back in 2005, in the middle of the great debt-fueled bull market for all assets, Lehman bought a 20% stake in the hedge fund.  I'm sure that hedge fund stake has surged in value since then.  
Moving on to other enlightening stories of how Lehman wisely chose to invest its capital during the boom, the WSJ has a story about Lehman's financing of SunCal, a developer that buys land, prepares it for houses and sells it to homebuilders.  Actually, I'm sure SunCal used to develop that land and sell to it homebuilders, but now it just holds a bunch of vacant land in Southern California.  In any event, Lehman has $2.2 billion in exposure to SunCal, which it has written down to $1.6 billion.  Lehman claims that much of the holdings are along the Pacific Coast where values have held up.  Values always hold up nicely until someone with significant bills tries to dump a bunch of land into a market where there are few buyers.  The SunCal investment is not a new revelation.  I wondered if the bank had taken enough of a markdown on this investment (as well as the Archstone REIT) given the pummeling in land values in SoCal on June 16th, after Lehman's earnings announcement.  I suppose the Wall Street Journal felt a civic duty to point out to the Koreans exactly what they were considering investing in. 
Despite all of the negative headlines, reports persist that multiple buyers are dying to buy the beleaguered investment bank.  Consortiums of Korean Banks, HSBC, the Korean Military Fund, you name it.  They all want a piece and are willing to pay a premium to book value!  I'll believe it when I see it.  If and when it happens, I will eat my crox.       

Tuesday, September 2, 2008

Speculation on a Really Slow News Day

Labor Day is over.  Financial market participants are back from vacation.  The action is supposed to heat up, with exciting news and announcements ending the summer market doldrums.  Instead we get groundbreaking new stories such as this one from the Associated Press entitled "Merrill slides against mostly rising market."  Don't bother clicking on the link, I'll summarize:  Merrill's stock is down today while other brokerage stocks are higher.  The reporter called Merrill for a comment and no spokesman was available.  Had a spokesman been available they may have had the following to say: "Um, hmmm, that's odd.  Hold please...We just fired our fundamental analyst last week for not forecasting that we'd lose $40 billion dollars this year so no comment from him, but our technical analyst says our stock was clearly overbought last week."  
If the Merrill news was not hard enough news for you, there was yet another report on KDP's continued interest in taking a stake in Lehman Brothers.  The new version of the story is that KDP is rounding up a consortium of Korean Banks to possibly buy Lehman.  The Korean market liked that news so much that it promptly plummeted 4% yesterday.  No sources were cited in the story, which firmly puts it in the category of "rampant speculation."  At this point, I wouldn't be surprised at all if insiders at Lehman were donning their best fake Korean accents and calling up reporters to keep the story alive.  Drastic measures are necessary to keep the market focused on the idea that somebody wants to buy something that Lehman has to sell.  Otherwise, Lehman has to come up with a new hare-brained scheme involving good banks and bad banks and crazy spin-off recaps with financing included to report in conjunction with the large losses it will surely report this quarter.  The good news is, the truth will be revealed in a few short weeks when Lehman reports earnings.  Speculation in the meantime is sure to continue.  

Monday, August 25, 2008

Korean Regulators Put Kibosh on KDB/Lehman Takeover Rumors

South Korea's top financial regulator indicated that it was not pleased at the prospect of a Lehman takeover by Korea Development Bank.  The regulator warned that KDB should take a "cautious" approach to buying an overseas bank and that such a deal should be led by private lenders.  Piling on $630 billion in Lehman's assets onto KDB's $120 billion balance sheet can only be viewed as cautious by those who feel Fannie Mae doesn't have enough leverage.  Investors who actually drove up the price of Lehman on Friday purely on the basis of this ridiculous idea may have been the same ones who bought into Richard Bove's widely circulated analyst note which surmised that Lehman was ripe for a hostile takeover.  The note received a ridiculous amount of press, presumably because it was a very slow news day.  Nevertheless, it made me consider hiring Mr. Bove's publicist because I can't understand how something so inconsequential could get so much attention from the financial press.
The basic gist of the note is that Lehman's management believes its assets are more valuable than the market price.  The company has made numerous attempts to sell a variety of assets but refuses to accept the bids it is receiving from potential investors.  Based on the fact that the market capitalization of the entire company is equal to his valuation of the Neuberger Berman subsidiary, Mr. Bove concludes that the company is grossly undervalued and is ripe for a hostile takeover.  I tend to draw an alternative conclusion: that management at Lehman is completely delusional and is not willing to accept that its valuations are overstated.  Furthermore, I look at the investing climate and wonder who is in a position to perform a hostile takeover of an investment bank with over $600 billion in assets?  I would immediately rule out the remaining investment banks due to too much overlap in businesses.  The large money center banks have so many of their own problem assets that they would not want to digest such a huge acquisition.  Wells Fargo, one of the few healthy financial institutions large enough to actually do the deal, is featured in a front page Financial Times story claiming it has no interest in acquiring a struggling rival.  Private equity is out because of regulatory issues, not to mention financing issues.  So who's left?  Overseas banks?  Maybe, but unlikely.  It seems we can count the Korean's out. 
      

Friday, August 22, 2008

Can KDB Buy Lehman?

Reports about Korea Development Bank taking over Lehman Brothers has caused optimism to return to the financial sector.  Reuters initially reported that the bank was "open" to an acquisition.  Both Lehman and KDB declined to comment on the story so investors assumed there was a nugget of truth to the rumors.  What I have yet to see so far is any discussion on whether KDB actually can afford to buy Lehman Brothers.  I took a quick look at KDB's balance sheet and noted that at December 2007, KDB only had 146 trillion Korean won in assets and 21 trillion Korean won in shareholder's equity.  With the Korean won trading at 1,062 to the dollar, this translates into roughly $146 billion in assets and $21 billion in shareholder's equity.  And it plans to pile Lehman's $639 billion in assets and $613 billion in liabilities onto its balance sheet?  And then go private?  It seems incredibly unlikely to me.
Analyst Richard Bove made a very bold call yesterday claiming that Lehman was ripe for a hostile takeover.  Sure it is.  Given Lehman's recent frantic attempts to strike a deal with anything that moves to sell whatever it can get a bid for, I am hard pressed to believe that Lehman is cheap.  If anything, given how spreads on MBS and CMBS have continued to widen back to levels not seen since March, Lehman's assets continue to deteriorate which means more writedowns, more losses, and a need for more capital.  The only financial institution in a position to do a hostile takeover of Lehman is the Fed, and they have their hands tied with Fannie and Freddie...